A Scalable Extension of Group Key Management Protocol by Poovendran, R. et al.
The Center for Satellite and Hybrid Communication Networks is a NASA-sponsored Commercial Space
Center also supported by the Department of Defense (DOD), industry, the State of Maryland, the
University of Maryland and the Institute for Systems Research. This document is a technical report in
the CSHCN series originating at the University of Maryland.
Web site  http://www.isr.umd.edu/CSHCN/
TECHNICAL RESEARCH REPORT
A Scalable Extension of Group Key Management Protocol
by R. Poovendran, S. Ahmed, S. Corson, J. Baras
CSHCN T.R. 98-5
(ISR T.R. 98-14)
A SCALABLE EXTENSION OF GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL

R. Poovendran, S. Ahmed, S. Corson, J. Baras
Institute for System Research
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20472
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a robust, scalable extension to the
recently proposed multicast Group Key Management
Protocol (GKMP) ([1], [2]), in terms of security ad-
ministration. The GKMP has two major security re-
lated problems, (a) lack of any mechanism to remove
a compromised group administrator, (b) lack of scal-
ability. We are able to remove a compromised single
panel member from generating the group keys by setting
the panel members with shared authority to generate the
group keys. We then introduce the sub-controllers who
have all the functionalities of the group control panel ex-
cept the authority to generate the group keys. The sub-
control panel helps scalability of the network in terms of
the security operations. The sub-controllers are chosen
using a threshold based clustering algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Many military and Internet applications are based on
multicast communication. These applications often
need privacy and protection from intruders. In order to
enforce the privacy and protection, these applications
require cryptographic key usage for secure admission of
new members and secure communication among exist-
ing members. The issue of exchanging the relevant keys
in a multicast environment is an active area of research.
Apart from the secure joining and information ex-
change, there are other administrative duties related to
security and communication that a group should pro-
vide. For example, mobility of the members is an issue
in some multicast groups. In a highly dynamic group,
members may decide to leave the group and rejoin at a
later time. It is also possible that late arriving members
get access to the previous data of the session in progress
to get the context of the current communication.
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Depending on the anticipated size and nature of the
group, it may be possible to establish some mechanism
to control the security and other administrative duties of
the group. In a military environment, it is possible that
a high command authority provides the necessary key to
the selected members who will establish the group. This
may be done in person in a one-on-one manner. Though
this method is possibly secure, it is rather inecient.
Another way to establish a secure group is to have a
dedicated Key Distribution Center (KDC) to generate
and issue high quality keys (symmetric). Everyone who
wants to join a particular group will have to request
an appropriate key from the KDC. After verication of
the member's credentials, the KDC will issue the nec-
essary symmetric key encrypted using the session key
between the KDC and the member. This mechanism
has the following advantage: if the group key is com-
promised, KDC can individually contact the members
and rekey the group. However, this method has the fol-
lowing disadvantages: (a) regardless of the size of the
group, every new member has to join via the KDC, (b)
every time the key is updated, the KDC should be able
to access all the members, (c) if the number of groups
is large, which would be the case in the Internet, the
KDC would be heavily over loaded, (d) if the KDC is
compromised, then the credentials of all the groups will
be accessible by the intruder.
The GKMP [1] allows a designated group member called
the group controller to generate and distribute the keys
for privacy and security. In doing so, the KDC is ef-
fectively replaced by another security entity (entities)
which operates at the group level. Any node of the net-
work can be a group controller as long as it is certied
to do so by a Security Manager (SM). This approach
essentially creates virtual KDC for each group.
The use of an entity other than KDC requires that ad-
ditional security related concerns are addressed. When
the KDC was used for group key generation and distri-
bution, the authentication of the members at the time
of joining was implicit since the KDC had to have au-
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thenticated the member before giving the group key to
the member. In the case of GKMP, the group controller
need not have the information and/or the authority to
authenticate a new member. Hence, the group con-
troller needs to have the support of a secure entity that
can perform the needed authentication. The GKMP
assumes that such an entity exists and is accessible.
Without this assumption, the key generation and key
distribution to the group members can not guarantee
the desired secure joining. The GKMP, however, is not
able to deal with a compromised member and scalabil-
ity. Our approach addresses these two critical issues in
this paper. These are critical since the GKMP is sup-
posed to be for secure multicast communication.
The paper is organized as follows: We rst present an
overview of the GKMP mechanism and identify some
critical shortcomings of the GKMP. We then present
the necessary modications to the GKMP, including a
clustering scheme.
BACKGROUND OF GKMP
Among the multicast key management protocols we
know of ([1], [2], [3]), the GKMP is independent of the
architecture of the multicast network being used. The
GKMP proposes to create grouped symmetric keys and
distribute them amongst communicating peers. The
GKMP has several desirable properties that are well
suited for a multicast group since, (1) it is virtually in-
visible to operator, (2) no central key distribution site
is needed, (3) only group members have the key, (4) it
allows sender or receiver-oriented operation, (5) it can
make use of any multicast communications protocols.
The GKMP assumes that there is a Group Key Man-
agement (GKM) application available and executable
by any node in the network.
We note that although the GKMP has been able to re-
move the constraint of having a centralized KDC, it re-
quires the existence of a similar mechanism and assumes
that this role is performed by a SM. It is necessary to
have this central entity since, at the beginning, everyone
has to be authenticated and there has to be a mecha-
nism to validate a new member's identity. For this pur-
pose, there has to be a central location or a replicated
central location which has all security parameters and
the other credentials. This functionality is independent
of the key generation for a particular group. Clearly,
more than one group may have to verify the same secu-
rity parameter information from the SM during a new
membership application process.
The GKMP group security administration consists of
the following steps:
1. SELECTION OF THE GROUP KEY
CONTROLLER
Independent of whether the system is sender-initiated
or receiver-initiated, the initial task is the identication
of the group originator. The originator of a multicast
group rst obtains a certication from a trusted entity
verifying that the originator is responsible for generating
and distributing the group key. The originator then
sends the membership list to the GKM.
We note that the specication of GKMP is quite exible
since it is not tied to any particular naming convention
or crypto scheme. We also note that before sending the
member list to the GKM, the originator has to verify
each join request using the security manager which is
still a central authority. This authority may be dupli-
cated but can not be removed like the KDC due to the
very nature of the function it has to perform. Therefore,
implicit in the assumption of the member list generation
is a central security entity for nal authentication.
2. GROUP KEY CREATION
The initial member list is used by the GKM applica-
tion to generate the Group Key Packet (GKP). The
GKMP currently allows the GKM to arbitrarily se-
lect and contact any one member from the list pro-
vided by the originator and generate the GKP. The
GKP contains the current Group trac encrypting key
(GTEK) and the future Group Key Encrypting Key
(GKEK). The GKMP allows GKM to identify itself as
the group key controller, which is validated by the mem-
ber participating in the GKP generation. The GKP
has the following format as specied by the GKMP:
GKP = [GTEKn; GKEKn+1], where the index n de-
notes the number of times the GKP has been updated.
We note that the GKMP allows the GKM to choose
the security parameters. We note that this mecha-
nism of GKMP is neither necessary nor desirable. We
propose to have the group originator specify a desired
level/range of security for the group.
3. GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION AND
REKEYING
Once the GKP is generated, the group controller dis-
tributes it to every member of the group. In distribut-
ing the GKP, the group controller rst contacts every
member, veries the security parameters of the mem-
ber and then generates a Session key Packet (SKP)
for that member. The SKP contains TEK and KEK
and has the form: SKP = [STEK, SKEK]. This SKP
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is rst given to the member encrypted using the pub-
lic key of the member. The controller then uses the
SKEK of that member to encrypt the GKP and then
creates a Group Rekey Package (GRP) for that mem-
ber. The GRP with the usual notations is of the form:
GRP = ffGKPgSKEKgPKcontroller .
When the group has to be rekeyed, the GKMP allows
GKM to contact any member of the group and generate
a new GKP and then broadcast it after encrypting using
the old GKEK.
This approach has the following problem as pointed out
in [1]: if a current member is compromised, the proposed
method of rekeying will not be eective since the com-
promised member still has the access to the old GKEK
and can decrypt the new GKP. One expensive way to
eliminate the compromised member is to generate the
GKP and then contact each member individually and
distribute the keys. This may be very costly as pointed
out by the GKMP.
MAJOR SECURITY RELATED
SHORTCOMINGS GKMP
Although the GKMP allowed \peer-managed" secure
keying mechanism and allowed any member to be group
controller, only one member is allowed (by some election
mechanism) to serve as a group controller at any given
time. Allowing one group controller to generate the keys
leads to some problems discussed below.
1. SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE
Although the group controller takes the partial role of
KDC in generating the desired keys, the role of group
controller is being performed by a single node at any-
time. Hence the failure of the group controller node
will lead to denial of service for new membership and
group and session key generations are temporarily ter-
minated. If the controller fails during the key gener-
ation period, the whole group has to be rekeyed since
the keys have xed lifespans. This is can be a serious
threat if the group is quite large. Apart from physical
node failure, if the controller is compromised, currently
there is no mechanism in GKMP to immediately pre-
vent the controller from further generating group keys
until another member is elected as the group controller
by the security manager. The GKMP does not have any
mechanism -other than rekeying the group- to remove a
compromised controller. We will show that it is possible
make sure that no compromised member takes the role
of controller once identied as compromised.
2. LACK OF SCALABILITY IN SECURITY
RELATED ADMINISTRATION
Since a single controller is responsible for generating the
keys and also validating the entries of the new members,
as the group size becomes larger, the node having the
role of group controller will be heavily loaded. Though
having a -node other than the conventional KDC- act
as the group controller helps to distribute the load on
dierent nodes for dierent groups, each group still has
a single node functioning in the role of KDC. Although
the GKMP proposed to allow any member to have the
ability to perform operations other than the key gen-
eration, this has a serious problem when members are
compromised. There is no way to prevent a compro-
mised member from being able to permit intruders into




Our solution to the shortcomings of GKMP is discussed
below.
1. ROBUSTNESS OF THE GROUP
CONTROLLER
In providing security, we need to ensure network sur-
vivability and continuous service in the presence of any
node failure. Failure may be due to physical failure at
the node, link failure and/or existence of a compromised
group controller. As noted earlier, having a single node
as group controller leaves that node as the single point
of failure of the whole security network at-least for a
short period of time.
Considering the fact that the purpose of the multi-
cast communication is to possibly serve a large num-
ber of members, it is of interest to provide a group-
control mechanism that can survive a single point of
failure. Apart from functional survivability, the new
group-control mechanism should also be able to pre-
vent a compromised group-controller from being able to
generate any future keys for the group. These features
are not present in the current form of GKMP. In pro-
viding robustness, a criteria for robustness has to be
chosen. We opted to choose the Byzantine robustness
model. We are able to achieve the desired properties of
the group-control mechanism as described below.
First, the notion of group controller is changed to a panel
of controllers. This panel consists of three members at
any given time. Among these three, one will serve as
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the active group controller, with the group keys being
generated by two panel members with the constraint
that no two panel members may participate in consecu-
tive key generations. This approach allows every panel
member to have only shared key generation authority.
At least two members of the control panel have to agree
in order to rekey the group. The only exception comes
when the group is of size less than three in which case
the communication reduces to a pairwise event or no
communication at all.
The proposed scheme ensures that (a) a single member
of the control-panel can leave the group at any time,
(b) any physical failure (node, link etc.) of a single
controller does not aect the immediate functioning of
the group, (c) if any one controller is compromised, the
other two may inform the SM to replace the compro-
mised controller of any active duties, (d) ACL, RCL,
membership verication and routing need not be per-
formed by the same member of the control panel, (e)
since the number of controllers is three, we can ran-
domly send data packets to the panel members with
some probability distribution. This prevents an attacker
from tapping into a single line to get the information.
Replacing a single group controller with a panel of
three members adds more functionality to the panel and
reduces the probability of failure of the whole group
controller panel. As in the case of the single group-
controller, any member can serve as a panel member.
However, at any given time only three members will be
serving on the panel. The panel membership may be
updated due to one of the following reasons, (a) a panel
member may leave the group region or the communi-
cation range in a dynamic environment, (b) node or a
link failure may prevent one or more panel members
from playing the role of the controller, (c) one or more
members of a panel are compromised.
If a member has to leave the panel, the leaving mem-
ber has to inform the rest of the panel members and
the SM about it. This policy requires a voluntary ser-
vice that may not be feasible under circumstances like
a node failure. So there has to be another mandatory
mechanism to check the aliveness of the three members
without having to involve the rest of the group.
In order to ensure that the group functionalities are
independent of a particular member in the panel, we
suggest that all three members have a mechanism for
keeping track of the other current panel members. This
may be achieved using a periodic \hello" message mech-
anism. At any given time, two panel members can send
the check packet with the time stamp, signed using the
private key. The receiver checks the message, encrypts
the time stamp in the received data packet, signs the
encrypted message using the private key and sends it
back to the sender. If all the members are functional,
this will happen before the allocated wait time. If there
is a problem with one of the members, the member will
fail to participate in this process.
2. SCALABILITY OF THE CONTROLLER
PANEL
If one member is compromised, then the other two mem-
bers can inform the SM to eectively remove the com-
promised panel member. We note that if more than one
panel member is compromised, the protection mecha-
nism we have proposed is at the same level as the GKMP
or KDC in terms of the ability to deal with a compro-
mised member. However, the probability of more than
one panel member failing at the same time is lower than
that of a single node failure.
We note that authentication, verication, join-
authorization, session key parameter negotiation and
distribution have to be scalable for a dynamic multi-
cast group. These security operations are independent
of the current GKP generation. Hence, these functions
need not be performed by the core-control panel. This
observation is the key to scalability. We note that only
the GKP generation is tied to the group controllers.
One way to achieve scalability is to allow any member
to perform all these operations (GKMP suggests this).
However, there is a security threat in doing so. As noted
in the case of the controller in GKMP, if any member
is allowed to perform many of the security operations
such as key exchange, ACL, RCL updates, etc., there
is no way to remove or prevent the compromised mem-
ber from allowing intruders into the group and further
compromising the group.
To eectively scale the key exchange, ACL, RCL and
other issues, we propose to have the group rst seg-
mented into clusters and each cluster managed by a
sub-controller panel of three members which has all the
authorities of the main control panel except the GKP
generation. Every sub-panel member is allowed to have
only shared authority and no two panel members are al-
lowed to perform any operation consecutively. We note
that if one sub-control panel member is compromised,
the member can be eectively stripped of the control
functionalities by SM without aecting the cluster func-
tions.
In our scheme, only one panel is identied as core and is
responsible for generating the group key packet which
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includes the GTEK and GKEK. The core panel then
transmits this information to the cluster panels which
will then use the information in generating the session
keys, etc. The need for cluster or sub-group being trans-
parent to the existing members forces this kind of struc-
ture. Having a global GKP enables a member of a group
to reach the other members without having to know in
which cluster the members reside.
We note that of the sub-cluster panel members can per-
form several of the security-related and other admin-
istrative tasks. The sub-group controllers or the clus-
ter controllers perform the following tasks: (a) serve
as routers, (b) receive the group key packet from the
core-control panel for re-keying, (c) authenticate and is-
sue new memberships; negotiate with new members and
generate the necessary session key for the new members,
(d) keep local ACL, RCL, and other group management
activities, (e) serve as loggers.
Another approach is to let each of the clusters be au-
tonomous. If any particular cluster is known to be com-
promised, that can be separately rekeyed without aect-
ing the rest of the group. But this comes with the cost
that each cluster has to use another key to encrypt the
key used by the cluster for intra-cluster communication.
3. FORMATION OF CLUSTERS AND
SUB-GROUP PANELS
The size of any particular group is the deciding factor
in formation of clusters and hence the sub-group pan-
els. Independent of the type of the multicast group,
the clustering involves the following steps: (a) cluster
formation, (b) cluster splitting, (c) cluster merging, (d)
cluster joining.
Cluster formation involves setting up the cluster sub-
control panel id, establishing a cluster id, and setting
up the link to the neighboring clusters, if any. One
way to pick the initial sub-group panel is to pick three
members with the highest ids. Since each member has to
have a unique id, this is a simple mechanism for starting
the panel. Thereafter, the panel may follow a policy to
update the panel in a periodic or need-based method.
In a given cluster, a threshold mechanism can be used
to nd if the number of members exceeds a xed thresh-
old. Only the local sub-control panel is allowed to make
the decision to split the cluster. Once the cluster split
decision is made, the sub-control panel chooses three
members from the current cluster and informs that to
the SM. The SM then assigns the authority to the new
sub-control panel and informs the group by multicast-
ing the new sub-panel information. The cluster id's can
be based on the crypto identities of the panel members.
As pointed out earlier, since the key exchange is trans-
parent to the cluster a member is currently in, if the
member migrates to another cluster, there is no need
for a new key exchange as long as the member has the
current GKEK and GTEK. If GTEK is not used, any




In this paper we proposed a robust, scalable extension to
the Group Key Management protocol for multicast com-
munication. By replacing the single group controller
by a panel, we reduced the threat of the node failure.
This scheme also helps in removal of a panel member if
the member is compromised. We then introduced the
sub-groups that had all the security related authorities
except the generation of the Group Key Packet. The
sub-group panels help in scalability of the secure join-
ing, authentication, and revocation. The following is-
sues are addressed in a related material to be presented
elsewhere for such a key management protocol, (a) GKP
generation, (b) removal of a compromised member.
REFRENCES
[1] H. Harney C. Muckenhirn, \GKMP Architecture",
RFC 2093, July 1997.
[2] H. Harney, C. Muckenhirn, \GKMP Specication",
RFC 2094, July 1997.
[3] A. Ballardie, \Scalable Multicast Key Distribution",
RFC 1949, May 1996.
[3] R. Poovendran, S. Corson, J. Baras, \A Scalable
Multicast Key Management Protocol (SMKMP) for
Mobile Agents", to be presented at the Mobile Agents
and Security Workshop, Oct. 1997, UMBC, Maryland.
1\The views and conclusions contained in this document are
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as represent-
ing the ocial policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army
Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government.
5
